

BEFORE THE GROWTH MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD  
CENTRAL PUGET SOUND REGION  
STATE OF WASHINGTON

LOWELL ANDERSON, JEFFREY  
RODGERS, DOUGLAS HAMAR, CHAD  
MCCAMMON AND BOB MARTIN,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF MONROE,

Respondent.

**CASE No. 12-3-0007**

*(Anderson)*

**ORDER ON DISPOSITIVE MOTION**

This matter came before the Board on the City of Monroe's motion to dismiss the Petition for Review (PFR) for mootness.<sup>1</sup> The Board finds the challenged ordinance has been repealed by the City and the appeal is accordingly moot. The petition is dismissed.

**PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF FACTS**

On July 10, 2012, the City of Monroe adopted Ordinance No. 018-2012 which amended its comprehensive plan to reclassify approximately 50 acres in the East Monroe area from Limited Open Space to General Commercial. At the time, an appeal of the Final Phased Environmental Impact Statement (FSEIS) for the reclassification was pending before the City's Hearing Examiner. The Examiner held a hearing July 19, 2012, and issued a decision determining: "The FSEIS . . . defers all environmental analysis to the future rather than addressing the 'big picture' before the decision to change the land use designation and zoning is made. Thus, the FSEIS is inadequate as a matter of law."<sup>2</sup> The Hearing Examiner's decision was not appealed.

<sup>1</sup> Respondent City of Monroe's Motion to Dismiss (Nov. 6, 2012).

<sup>2</sup> Hearing Examiner's Decision – Revised After Reconsideration, August 8, 2012, p.19

1 On September 4, 2012, the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 019/2012 which repealed  
2 Ordinance No. 018/2012. At the same meeting, the City Council re-docketed the East  
3 Monroe area for comprehensive plan review in 2013 and terminated its contract with the  
4 Hearing Examiner.<sup>3</sup>

6  
7 On September 17, 2012, Petitioners, who live in homes on the bluff above the East Monroe  
8 area,<sup>4</sup> filed an appeal of Ordinance No. 018/2012 with the Growth Management Hearings  
9 Board. The PFR asserted the repeal of the ordinance did not render the case moot.<sup>5</sup>

10  
11 Following a prehearing conference and the issuance of a Prehearing Order setting the  
12 schedule for filing motions and briefs, the City of Monroe timely filed its dispositive motion  
13 asserting the challenge to the repealed ordinance should be dismissed as moot.<sup>6</sup>  
14 Petitioners' responsive brief was filed November 29, 2012, and the City replied on  
15 December 3, having not yet received the Petitioner's Response.<sup>7</sup> On December 5, 2012,  
16 the City filed a Motion to Strike Petitioners' Response for failure to file and serve in  
17 accordance with the case schedule.  
18

## 19 **BOARD DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

### 20 **Motion to Supplement the Record**

21  
22 Because of the Board's decision on the City's dispositive motion, the motion to supplement  
23 the record is not addressed.  
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28 <sup>3</sup> PFR at 5-6.

29 <sup>4</sup> PFR at 9. According to the Hearings Examiner's Findings of Fact, the East Monroe area contains an oxbow  
30 slough of the Skykomish River. The area is subject to floods and inundation which creates a risk of  
31 undercutting the toe of the bluff. The bluff is high (100-200 feet) and steep (>40%) with a history of landslides.

32 <sup>5</sup> PFR at 10-11.

<sup>6</sup> Petitioners also filed a motion to supplement the record (Nov. 7, 2012), to which the City responded with  
objections (Nov. 27, 2012).

<sup>7</sup> Response to City of Monroe's Motion to Dismiss (Nov. 29, 2012);  
Respondent City of Monroe's Reply (Dec. 3, 2012)

1 **Motion to Strike**

2 The Board strikes Petitioner's Response to City of Monroe's Motion to Dismiss as untimely  
3 filed. The Prehearing Order set a November 27 deadline for response to dispositive  
4 motions. Petitioners' Response was signed November 28 – a day late – and received by the  
5 Board, according to its electronic records, at 5:10 p.m. on that date. WAC 242-03-240(1)  
6 provides that documents received electronically in the Board's office after 5:00 p.m. will be  
7 stamped received on the following day.<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, Petitioners' Response, due November  
8 27, was filed November 29.  
9

10  
11 WAC 242-03-240(2) requires electronic service on other parties: "Service is accomplished  
12 when the document is transmitted electronically ... by the required date." The City's Motion  
13 to Strike states the Response was not served on the City electronically but by U.S. mail and  
14 was not received by the City's attorney until December 4, a day after the deadline for the  
15 City's reply. The City's Reply (timely filed on December 3) asks the Board to grant the  
16 motion to dismiss because "Petitioners Lowell Anderson, et al. did not file a response to the  
17 City's motion and have thus effectively conceded the City's request." The City subsequently  
18 received Petitioners' Response and filed the motion to strike.  
19

20  
21 The Board **grants** the motion to strike Petitioners' Response.<sup>9</sup> The Board considers the  
22 City's dispositive motion without reference to Petitioners' November 29, 2012 Response. In  
23 deciding the City's dispositive motion, the Board relies on the facts and authorities in the  
24 PFR, the City's Motion and Reply, and the Board's own research.  
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29  
30 <sup>8</sup>WAC 242-03-240(1) "...Any transmission not completed before 5:00 p.m. will be stamped received on the  
31 following business day. The date and time indicated by the board's . . . receiving computer will be presumptive  
32 evidence of the date and time of receipt of transmission . . . ."

<sup>9</sup> The Board empathizes with the pressures on sole practitioners working often without staff or the backup of  
fellow attorneys. We expect attorneys to extend professional courtesy and allow flexibility when the other party  
calls and requests accommodation in tight circumstances. Here there was apparently no request.

1 **Motion to Dismiss**

2 The City advances two arguments in support of dismissal for mootness. First, the City  
3 asserts that any governmental action taken in violation of SEPA is void and “a legal nullity  
4 from inception.”<sup>10</sup> Under the Monroe Municipal Code MMC 20.04.2000(B)(3), an  
5 unappealed hearing examiner’s decision on EIS adequacy is a final decision. Ordinance  
6 018/2012, having been adopted under a legally deficient EIS, is accordingly void, the City  
7 states, and any challenge to it is therefore moot.  
8

9  
10 Second, the City asserts the challenge is moot because “Ordinance 018/2012 has been  
11 repealed and there is nothing left for the parties to litigate.”<sup>11</sup>

12  
13 Petitioners in their PFR assert this matter falls under the exception for mootness for “matters  
14 of continuing and substantial interest,” allowed in *Orwick v. Seattle*.<sup>12</sup> Petitioners state the  
15 case involves substantial public participation challenges, and that the “issues are likely to  
16 recur in the future,” given the City’s pattern of behavior and apparent commitment to the  
17 project.<sup>13</sup>  
18

19 The Board starts from the premise that it is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, authorized by  
20 statute to hear challenges to the adoption and amendment of comprehensive plans and  
21 development regulations. RCW 36.70A.280(1)(a). The relief the Board is authorized to  
22 provide is a finding of non-compliance and a determination of invalidity. RCW 36.70A.300;  
23 .302. Washington courts have held that “[a] case is moot if a court can no longer provide  
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27 <sup>10</sup> Motion at 5, citing *Barrie v. Kitsap County*, 93. Wn.2d 843, 861, 613 P.2d 1148 (1980); *Juanita Bay Valley*  
28 *Community Ass’n v. City of Kirkland*, 9 Wn. App. 59, 73, 510 P.2d 1140(1973); *Lassila v. Wenatchee*, 89  
29 Wn.2d 804, 817, 576 P.2d 54 (1978); *Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc.*, 82 Wn.2d 475,  
30 497-98, 513 P.2d 36 (1973).

31 <sup>11</sup> Motion at 7-8, citing *Kent Cares, et al. v. City of Kent*, CPSGMHB No. 02-3-0019, Order on Motions (March  
32 14, 2003), at 8; *McVittie, et al. v. Snohomish County*, CPSGMHB No.99-3-0016c, Final Decision and Order  
(Feb. 9, 2000), at 14; *Gawenka, et al. v. Bremerton*, CPSGMHB No. 00-3-0011, Order on Dispositive Motion  
(Oct. 10, 2000), at 3.

<sup>12</sup> 103 Wn.2d 249, 253, 692 P.2d 793 (1984).

<sup>13</sup> PFR at 10-11, citing *McVittie*.

1 effective relief.”<sup>14</sup> Mootness is directed at jurisdiction, and as such may be raised at any  
2 time.<sup>15</sup> In *Harbor Lands, LP*,<sup>16</sup> the Court of Appeals determined the case was moot because  
3 the City of Blaine had rescinded the challenged land use decision prior to entry of the  
4 Superior Court’s judgment.

5  
6 Applying the Court’s reasoning, repeal of an ordinance renders an appeal to the Board moot  
7 “because there is no currently effective legislative action to challenge.”<sup>17</sup> As the Western  
8 Board explained in *ARD v. Mason County*,<sup>18</sup> when the county rescinds the challenged  
9 ordinances, “jurisdiction to continue the case is lost. Where there are no DRs for which a  
10 finding of compliance or noncompliance could be made, a board must dismiss the case.” In  
11 *Hazen v. Yakima County*,<sup>19</sup> the Eastern Board pointed out when a challenged provision has  
12 been amended or repealed, “the amendment/repeal provides the relief requested by  
13 petitioner,” and the matter is moot. The Central Board in *Giba, et al v. City of Burien*<sup>20</sup>  
14 stated: “With the repeal of Section 2, the Board **no longer has subject matter jurisdiction**.  
15 The Board also notes that by the repeal of Section 2 the **City itself has provided the relief**  
16 requested by Petitioners.”(emphasis added)  
17  
18

19 The Board notes that the City of Monroe has put the East Monroe area on its 2013  
20 comprehensive plan amendment docket and begun the phased EIS process. The PFR  
21 alleges a pattern of SEPA and public process violations by the City in support of the East  
22  
23  
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26 <sup>14</sup> *Orwick*, 103 Wn. 2d at 249.

27 <sup>15</sup> *Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov’t v. City of Spokane*, 99 Wn.2d 339, 350 (1983).

28 <sup>16</sup> *Harbor Lands, LP v. City of Blaine*, 146 Wn. App. 589, 595 (2008).

29 <sup>17</sup> *Gawenka*, at 3. Other cases where Petitioners’ challenges were dismissed as moot when challenged  
30 provisions had been repealed or replaced include *Ellis Island v. San Juan County*, WWGMHB No. 97-2-0006,  
Final Decision and Order (June 19, 1997); *Martin v. Whatcom County*, WWGMHB No. 11-2-0002, Final  
Decision and Order (July 22, 2011), at 18-19; *Covington Golf v. City of Covington*, CPSGMHB No. 05-3-0049,  
Order of Dismissal (Feb. 7, 2008), at 2 (Board dismissed *sua sponte* on evidence of repeal of challenged  
31 provision).

32 <sup>18</sup> WWGMHB No. 01-2-0017, Order on Motions (Oct. 12, 2001).

<sup>19</sup> EWGMHB No. 08-1-0008c, Final Decision and Order (Apr. 5, 2010), at 13-14.

<sup>20</sup> CPSGMHB No. 06-3-0008, Order of Dismissal (Apr. 17, 2006), at 3 (emphasis added).

1 Monroe development. Petitioners fear procedural game-playing by the City and urge that  
2 “they should not be left to take their chances” on a future appeal of the City’s eventual  
3 action.<sup>21</sup> The PFR suggests the City’s “continuing action” brings this case within the narrow  
4 exception to the mootness doctrine for “matters of continuing and substantial interest.”<sup>22</sup>  
5

6 The Board disagrees. The Board assumes good faith on the part of public officials<sup>23</sup> and will  
7 not prejudice the City’s process. The City planning process and SEPA procedures will  
8 provide opportunities for Petitioners to get their facts into the new record and eventually  
9 appeal the City’s action, if it again appears to them to violate SEPA or the GMA. A Board  
10 ruling at this juncture on the repealed ordinance, for the purpose of guiding the City’s  
11 consideration of future proposals, would constitute an advisory opinion, which is prohibited  
12 by RCW 36.70A.290(1).  
13

14  
15 In conclusion, the Board finds Ordinance 018/2012 has been repealed by the City of  
16 Monroe. The challenged City action is no longer operative and the Board can no longer  
17 provide relief. The Board concludes the Petition for Review is moot and must be dismissed.  
18

## 19 ORDER

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21 Based on Ordinance 019/2012, the Petition for Review, the City’s Motion to Dismiss, the law  
22 and cases cited above, and having deliberated on the matter, the Board ORDERS:

- 23
- 24 • The City’s adoption of Ordinance No. 019/2012 renders the Petition for  
25 Review of Ordinance No. 018/2012 **moot**.  
26

27 <sup>21</sup> PFR at 10.

28 <sup>22</sup> Citing *Orwick and McVittie*. The Board notes another exception is when a 6-month moratorium adopted  
29 under RCW 36.70A.390 expires and is replaced by a subsequent moratorium. *DOC v. Lakewood*, CPSGMHB  
30 No. 05-3-0043c, Final Decision and Order (Jan. 31, 2006); *Camwest v. City of Sammamish*, CPSGMHB No.  
05-3-0027, Final Decision and Order (Aug. 4, 2005).

31 <sup>23</sup> *Petso II v. City of Edmonds*, CPSGMHB No. 09-3-0005, Final Decision and Order (Aug. 17, 2009), at 32;  
32 *Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Agency v. City of Tukwila*, CPSGMHB No. 99-3-0003, Final Decision  
and Order (Sep. 15, 1999), at 7; *Pilchuck v. Snohomish County*, CPSGMHB No. 95-3-0047, Final Decision  
and Order (Dec. 6, 1995), at 38.

- The matter of *Lowell Anderson, et al. v. City of Monroe* is **dismissed**.
- Case No. 12-3-0007 is **closed**.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2012.

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Margaret A. Pageler, Board Member

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Raymond L. Paoella, Board Member

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Cheryl Pflug, Board Member

Note: This is a final decision and order of the Growth Management Hearings Board issued pursuant to RCW 36.70A.300.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> Should you choose to do so, a motion for reconsideration must be filed with the Board and served on all parties within ten days of mailing of the final order. WAC 242-3-830(1), -840.  
A party aggrieved by a final decision of the Board may appeal the decision to Superior Court within thirty days as provided in RCW 34.05.514 or 36.01.050. See RCW 36.70A.300(5) and WAC 242-03-970.  
It is incumbent upon the parties to review all applicable statutes and rules. The staff of the Growth Management Hearings Board is not authorized to provide legal advice.